Korea Productivity Association
생산성논집, Vol.34 no.4 (2020)
중국 정부의 보조금이 하이테크 기업의 R&D 투자에 미치는 영향 : 내·외부 투자자 지분율의 조절효과를 중심으로
Diversifying consumer needs based on rapid change in technology, reducing product life cycle and easing trade barriers have strengthened the importance of R&D investment for the competitiveness of Chinese companies. The importance of R&D investment in high-tech industries was recognized not only at the firm level but also at the national level. However, an innovation requires a lot of money and time. Thus, unlike state-owned firms which are invested by state-owned institutions or by ministries, state-owned and private firms have not been active in R&D investments. The Chinese government has implemented various support policies, including tax exemptions, loans and subsidies, to intensify companies' R&D activities for innovation-driven growth. In particular, the government implements many subsidies policies for high-tech companies. In addition, Chinese companies have been transformed into modern firms with separate ownership and management since the government adopted a policy to privatize state-owned enterprises. China's stock market has grown rapidly. Ownership structures of many Chinese companies have been changed. The equity ratio of various internal and external investors has become an important factor affecting the strategic decision-making of firms. However, there are not many researches that analyze the impact of equity ratios of various internal- and external-investors of privatized Chinese companies on the corporate strategic decision-making process. Thus, this study is designed to analyze the effect of government subsidies on R&D concentration (R&D cost/sales) of high-tech companies of China, and the moderating effect of internal and external investors' equity ratios on this relationship. According to the findings, R&D concentration of Chinese high-tech companies increases when the ratio of government subsidies to total assets is low, while it decreases when the ratio of government subsidies to total assets is high. The findings were also shown that the CEO's equity ratio strengthens the positive relationship between government subsidies and R&D concentration when the ratio of government subsidies is not high, while strengthening the negative relationship between government subsidies and R&D concentration if the ratio of government subsidies increases above a certain level. In addition, they reveal that the institutional investor's equity share mitigates the slope of inverse U-shaped relationship between government subsidies and R&D concentration. However, the foreign investor's equity ratio has no statistically significant impact. The findings provide the theoretical implications that research on agent problems that may arise in relations between the government and the companies should be done from various perspectives that have been presented in the agency theory to increase the effectiveness of government subsidies for innovation of companies. In addition, they provide the implication for policy makers for the need to set and manage appropriate levels for subsidies in advance to enhance the innovation capabilities of high-tech companies. Finally, for practitioners the findings imply that the CEO's opportunistic behavior on government subsidies needs to be managed using internal control systems based on the equity rates of the CEO and institutional investors.